In Bernard Cornwell’s The Fort, the fledgling nation of the fragile United States of America is portrayed in a less than favorable light. This historical novel describes in painful detail the biggest naval blunder in American history. The Penobscot Expedition is little-known, and not discussed in most history books. Cornwell drags this small battle from the shadows of the past.
A small contingency of 700 Scotsmen arrived in the wilderness of what is now Maine in the summer of 1779, with the single purpose of standing between the rebels and Canada. Then part of Massachusetts, Majabigwaduce would be a name to make American leaders cringe in the years to come. The state government of Massachusetts, determined to deal with the British infestation without interference from the Continental Congress, assembled the largest rebel fleet to date. Forty-two ships set sail to ‘captivate, kill or destroy’ the redcoats. This astonishingly sized naval force was powered by only 900 men, many of whom were forced into service so that their state need not borrow soldiers from the nation.
Led by possibly one of the most incompetent commanders in history, General Solomon Lovell, one could argue that the expedition was doomed from the beginning. Lovell was no general. A community man, well-liked and personable, but a military man he was not. He had no control over his troops, commanded no respect, and often backed out of a necessary fight. His second-in-command, Brigadier-General Peleg Wadsworth, was beyond exasperation by the end of the less-than-successful undertaking.Lovell’s co-commander, Commodore Dudley Saltonstall, would be Massachusetts’ scapegoat when all was said and done. Combative and gruff, Saltonstall was not known for his disposition. However, any participant in the Penobscot Expedition, were they here to tell us, would vouch for the commander of the ships. It was Lovell’s lack of action that cost the Americans precious time. Instead of attacking immediately upon arrival, the general ordered his troops to make camp. This gave the Scotsmen plenty of time to build up their pitiful Fort George. As days passed without an assault, the walls of the fort grew higher and more defensible. As time wore on, Saltonstall refused to enter Penobscot Bay, defended by three British sloops of war, until the fort was taken by Lovell and the soldiers.
Saltonstall was not unreasonable with this demand. His logic was infallible. If the fort is taken, the ships are doomed anyway. Had he attacked the ships before the taking of the fort, the guns atop Dyce’s Head would surely have reduced his ships to so much timber. Lovell’s concerns were unfounded. His worry was that the sloops of war in the bay would attack his men in their ascent to the fort. Of course, in the end they argued so long that their time was squandered and British reinforcements arrived.
Cornwell does a spectacular job comparing the two commanders, Lovell of the land battle and Saltonstall of the sea. He presents both men in this high-pressure situation and truly unweaves the tangled mess that surrounds both the men and their expedition. His readers are confident in their knowledge that Lovell condemned the mission to failure. However, Massachusetts saddled Saltonstall with the blame, as he was the only Continental commander involved. By blaming the federal government’s asset, Massachusetts weaseled its way out of paying for the exorbitant cost of the failure, a sum that would be equivalent to around $300 million today.
History may have forgotten Saltonstall, as well as the expedition that was his downfall, but Bernard Cornwell exonerates the prickly commodore and points the finger at the person responsible, General Solomon Lovell.
